

# Exhibit L

1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
2 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK  
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3 SECURITIES and EXCHANGE  
4 COMMISSION,

5 Plaintiff,

6 v.

20CV10832(AT) (SN)  
Remote Proceeding

7 RIPPLE LABS, INC., et al.,

8 Defendants.

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10 New York, N.Y.  
11 March 30, 2021  
12 10:00 a.m.

13 Before:

14 HON. SARAH NETBURN,

15 U.S. Magistrate Judge

16 APPEARANCES

17 U.S. SECURITIES and EXCHANGE COMMISSION

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1 THE COURT: Thank you.

2 Mr. Kellogg, is there something you wanted to add to  
3 that.

4 MR. KELLOGG: Yes, your Honor. I will be quite brief.

5 I wanted to emphasize the practical consequences of  
6 what the SEC is doing here for our litigation. Once they file  
7 a complaint, they have stepped into an Article III forum and  
8 are subject to the rules of that forum. They have tried to  
9 evade that and those fundamental constraints by relying on an  
10 investigative tool, the MoUs, to conducts extensive  
11 international discovery. That is not a no-harm-no-foul  
12 situation as the SEC tries to suggest. It has two real world  
13 consequences that call into question the fairness of the  
14 proceeding.

15 First, even though they eventually have to share with  
16 us the documents they received through foreign regulators, they  
17 can skew the evidence by what they ask for. And they have done  
18 exactly that in the MoUs, or at least what they have told us  
19 about the MoUs. As Mr. Gertzman noted in the domestic  
20 discovery context if they want to serve a Rule 45 third-party  
21 subpoena, we get to see it first. If it is a one-sided request  
22 for information, we can add our own subpoena. In international  
23 discovery, the same holds true for letters rogatory under the  
24 Hague Convention. We get to see them first and we can request  
25 additional items to balance them out. But that is not the case

1 with MoUs. We don't get to see them before they go out.

2 Indeed, the SEC says we never get to see them and we don't get  
3 to add to them. That is critical here.

4 The SEC has asked 14 international digit-asset trading  
5 platforms, and I am quoting from their April 23 letter at page  
6 5 -- "Intraday XRP trading data for Ripple's XRP sales for  
7 certain time periods." It admits that such data "is critical  
8 to a central dispute between the parties whether XRP's price  
9 moves were influenced by Ripple's announcement." The Court  
10 knows how critical that is from the past argument we had. In  
11 other words, as we discussed at that argument, the information  
12 is critical to whether the price of XRP moves in conjunction  
13 with market forces rather than do solely or primarily to the  
14 efforts of Ripple.

15 The problem is that the SEC couched its request to get  
16 only the data that it thinks will support its argument. They  
17 are only looking for Ripple's sales at XRP even though those  
18 are only a tiny fraction of a percent of overall sales, and  
19 they reserve the right to cherrypick timeframes. To make our  
20 case, our experts need intraday trading data for all sales at  
21 XRP and for the entire period in 2013 to December 2020. That  
22 information is incredibly hard to get.

23 As the SEC knows the Hague Convention process is  
24 likely to be way too slow for the accelerated schedule in this  
25 case, a schedule I would stress we need to keep because of the

1 tremendous harm the filing of this suit has done to XRP holders  
2 throughout the world. We have been working very hard to get  
3 that data voluntarily from trade platforms and business  
4 partners throughout the world, which brings me to the second  
5 real-world consequence of the SEC's skirting the rules here.

6 When they filed this suit, it scared a lot of  
7 third-parties who were suddenly faced with the prospect of  
8 being sued for securities violation. Many exchanges as a  
9 result delisted XRP; some hedge funds dropped XRP from their  
10 portfolios; and businesses using XRP, for example, in the forum  
11 settlement process, stopped doing so. The remaining ones,  
12 particularly those in jurisdictions where regulators have  
13 concluded that XRP is not a security, these businesses are now  
14 being hit by massive document requests from their home  
15 regulators and they are understandably freaked out. We are  
16 very concerned about further delisting and the dissolution of  
17 existing business relationships.

18 Now, the SEC claims they are not deliberately  
19 intimidating companies continuing to use XRP. Whether  
20 deliberate or not, that is the result. Frankly, they are  
21 trying to destroy our business before we have our day in court  
22 and they are using what is an investigative tool in the  
23 completely different context of discovery without notice to us.

24 Indeed, they tried to keep this a secret. They kept  
25 it a secret from us. They kept it a secret from the foreign